

### School of Management and Law

Taxes versus Targets: An Empirical Analysis of two Policy Instruments on Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the Industry and Service Sector



**Building Competence. Crossing Borders.** 

#### **Thomas Leu**

#### **Motivation**

- •What is the effect of the Swiss climate policy mix on firms' energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the industry and service sector?
- •Is it possible to quantify a difference in the mitigation effect between a mandatory CO<sub>2</sub> levy and binding reduction target agreement.
- What are the challenges when facing such a research question?



#### **Outline of the Presentation**


- Introduction to the topic
- Descriptive overview of the energy consumption and GHG emissions in the industry and the service sector
- Switzerland's energy and climate policy instruments for the industry and the service sector
- The CO<sub>2</sub> levy and economic incentives
- Project and research question
- Description of the underlying two different databases
- Strategy for linking these two datasets
- Empirical strategy and descriptive overview
- Results from a previous study taking into account only the CO<sub>2</sub> tax
- Conclusion and outlook





## **Evolution of Switzerland's Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector, Aggregate Data 1990 – 2020**


Evolution of Switzerland's Greenhouse Gas Emissions subdivided by Sectors, 1990-2020 (Kyoto Targets for 2012 and 2020, Paris Target for 2030, Federal Target for 2050)



• In 2020, the industry and service sector account for 32.3% (yellow and green bars) of the total greenhouse gas emissions of 43.4 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>eq.



### Evolution of Switzerland's Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Industry & Service Sector, Aggregate Data 2000 – 2020



2013

2012

Year

2011

Data Source: Swiss Federal Office for the Environment FOEN, Own Calculations (2022)

2019


- The sectoral interim target path towards a maximum of 65% of the 1990 level in 2030 is indicated.
- The sectoral target of the CO<sub>2</sub> Ordinance is likely to be achieved.

2006 2007 2008



10

### The three main Climate Policy Instruments available in the Swiss Industry & Service Sector



- CO<sub>2</sub> levy on fossil heating and process fuels: Carbon tax imposed on fossil heating fuels (Default for the majority of the installations).
- Emissions trading scheme (ETS):
  Mandatory for 56 CO<sub>2</sub>-intensive companies («cap-and-trade»-principle, linked to EU ETS).
- Exemption from the CO<sub>2</sub> levy possible for CO<sub>2</sub>-intensive companies under certain conditions. In return, companies have to commit to an emissions target.




The CO<sub>2</sub> levy is the

instrument for the

majority of the

installations.

### Economic Incentives for applying for an Exemption from the CO<sub>2</sub> Levy



- The CO<sub>2</sub> Levy was increased 5 times after its introduction in 2008; last time in 2022.
- Starting position: CO<sub>2</sub> tax increases from CHF 36 to CHF 60 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>eq.
- A rational firm moves along the marginal abatement cost function from point ① to point ②.
- Total reduction costs: blue area. Tax costs: red area.
- The tax costs can be saved by committing to a target agreement.



#### Research Questions and Research Project

#### **Research Questions**

- What is the impact of the CO<sub>2</sub> tax versus the target agreements on greenhouse gas emissions mitigations in the industrial and services sector?
- Can the null-hypothesis, which states that the impact on greenhouse gas emissions mitigations does not differ between the two groups, econometrically be rejected, by applying microdata of firm behavior.

#### **Challenges**


- Two different datasets from two sources (Federal Office of Energy & Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector) must be linked.
- Finding an adequate econometric strategy to avoid self selection bias issues as well as the lack of a control group.



#### The Process of Data Collection

4	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	
1	year	ID AST	GROUP	AVOLLZ	ATEILZ	ABGF	BVM1	CVM1	CV
2	1999	1	13	6	0	400	0.2736	0.42982952	
3	2000	1	13	5	0	NA	0.2721312	0.35835935	
4	2001	1	13	6	1	NA	0.2592	0.39438018	
5	2002	1	13	3	0	NA	0.2574	0.32282597	
6	2003	1	13	5	1	NA	0.2664	0.32297725	
7	2007	1	13	4	1	300	0.2232	0.28762922	
8	2008	1	13	2	2	300	0.2124	0.2517926	
9	2009	1	13	1	1	120	0.1062	0.21592337	
10	2005	2	9	9	0	1160	0.112716	0.25143985	
11	2006	2	9	10	1	1160	0.1116	0.21562072	
12	2007	2	9	10	1	1100	0.155765	0.23830067	
13	2008	2		10	1	1100	0.128664	0.17992377	
14	2009	2	9	12	1	1100	0.107438	0.28728601	
15	1999	3	18	8	7	600	0.13572	0	
16	2000	3	18	15	0	650	0.126	0	
17	2002	3		11	9	650	0.1198872	0	
18	2003	3	18	10	11	650	0.1461276	0	
19	2006	3	18	14	7	650	0.1389672	0	
20	2007	3	18	14	9	650	0.137743	0	
21	2004	4	13	28	6	8937	2.0664576	1.14911685	
22	2005	4	13	27	9	8937	1.838448	0	
23	2006	4	13	32		7880	1.7243064	0.6180768	
24	2007	4	13	20	17	7880	2.641327	0	
25	2009	4	13	17	15	7880	2.041344	1.26811732	
26	2011	4	13	32	0	8635	2.2096224	1.25955354	

	ID Zielverei		ID Erfassung						Verbrauch
1	nbarun <sub>i</sub> *	Art der ZV ▼			Noga-Code *	Jahr 🕶	Energieträger		[MWh/a] =
5	cec1f7fb-c	Freiwillig (ohne zukünftigen Bescheinigungsansp	r cb89fe6c-	7	107100	2019	Elektrizität (Bezug)	******	1'097
5	cec1f7fb-c	Freiwillig (ohne zukünftigen Bescheinigungsansp	rcb89fe6c-	7	107100	2019	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		343
7	cec1f7fb-c	Freiwillig (ohne zukünftigen Bescheinigungsansp	cb89fe6c-	7	107100	2020	Elektrizität (Bezug)		1'080
3	cec1f7fb-c	Freiwillig (ohne zukünftigen Bescheinigungsansp	cb89fe6c-	7	107100	2020	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		407
9		Freiwillig (ohne zukünftigen Bescheinigungsansp				2021	Elektrizität (Bezug)		1'117
)	cec1f7fb-c	Freiwillig (ohne zukünftigen Bescheinigungsansp	r cb89fe6c-	7	107100	2021	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		405
ı		Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669				Elektrizität (Bezug)		3'968
2	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2013	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		11'419
3	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2014	Elektrizität (Bezug)		3'765
į	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2014	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		10'298
5	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2015	Elektrizität (Bezug)		3'126
5	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2015	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		8'383
7	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2016	Elektrizität (Bezug)		2'797
	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2016	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		7′704
)	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2017	Elektrizität (Bezug)		2'651
)	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2017	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		7'700
	61b0bfac-6	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2018	Elektrizität (Bezug)		2'608
	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2018	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		7'332
	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600		Elektrizität (Bezug)		2′572
ı		Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2019	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		6'584
,	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2020	Elektrizität (Bezug)		2'438
		Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669			2020	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		6'439
7		Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600		Elektrizität (Bezug)		2′374
,	61b0bfac-	Reduktionspfad (individuell)	ea105669	-9	139600	2021	Erdgas (Brennstoff)		6'509
į	h7-25-014	n - Jl. 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1	1-1000-60		FF1001	2015	FI-I-4-1-1484 (D)		2/070







#### **Empirical Strategy I**

# Step I: (Data from the representative survey conducted by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy; plants exempted by the CO2 levy are identified and eliminated from the dataset):

- The causal effect of the different levels of the CO<sub>2</sub> tax, paid by those plants not being exempted from the tax, is empirically analyzed.
- Standard firm fixed effects regression models which control for unobserved heterogeneity of time-invariant plant-specific characteristics, such as the management's attitude toward environmental aspects, are applied.
- Regressions of the form are estimated:

$$y_{it} = D_k \tau + x'_{it} \eta + A'_t \gamma + \theta_i + \lambda t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- y<sub>it</sub>: dependent variable for the GGE of plant i in period t
- D<sub>k</sub>: policy vector indicating the different tax level periods
- x<sub>it</sub>: vector of time-variant firm specific factors (firm size, number of employees, etc.)
- A<sub>t</sub>: Vector of economy wide indicators (heating degree-days, oil price, economy-wide activity etc.)
- $\lambda$ : Time Trend to capture technological progress.



#### **Empirical Strategy II**

Step II: (Data from the representative survey conducted by Swiss Federal Office of Energy are linked with the data originating from the Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector):

- Plants of companies which committed themselves to a binding target agreement are identified by linking the SFOE sample with data from the Energy Agency.
- As firms self-select themselves into target agreement programs, differences-in-differences estimators or other quasi experimental methods are applied to best avoid self-selection issues.
- The null-hypothesis, which states that the impact on greenhouse gas emissions mitigations does not differ between the two groups, is being tested.
- The resulting empirical evidence might provide findings that allow to distinguish the impact of the CO<sub>2</sub> tax opposed to that of the target agreements.




### Description of the two Datasets I: Number of Installations / Firms

### SFOE: Representative sample of installations:

 Due to its representativeness, the SFOE sample more adequately represents the evolution of the economic sectors.

#### Number of Installations grouped by Sector (1999-2019) SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector




Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)

### EnAW: Firms exempted from the $CO_2$ tax $\rightarrow$ target agreement:

 Self selection and the entry restriction led to an overrepresentation of the industry sector.

Number of Firms grouped by Sector (2013-2019)
Population: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector



Data Source: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector EnAW (N = 41'079)




### **Description of the two Datasets II: Average Energy Consumption (TJ)**

#### SFOE: Representative sample of installations:

 Average energy consumption has been decreasing since 2008.


#### **Evolution of the Average Energy Consumption (1999-2019)** SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector



#### **EnAW:** Firms exempted from the $CO_2$ tax $\rightarrow$ target agreement:

 The higher average energy consumption of EnAW-firms is due to data on company instead of installation level.

> **Evolution of the Average Energy Consumption (2013-2021)** Population: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector



Data Source: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector EnAW (N = 41'079)






### Description of the two Datasets III: Average Energy Consumption (TJ)

### SFOE: Representative sample of installations (absolute Values):

 Average energy consumption has been decreasing since 2008.

#### Evolution of the Average Energy Consumption (1999-2019) SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector




Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)

### SFOE: Representative sample of installations (Index: 2008 = 100):

• Fossil energy consumption (-33%) is decreasing more than electricity consumption (-17%). This might be a hint for substitution processes.

Evolution of the Average Energy Consumption (1999-2019)
SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector



Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)






### **Description of the two Datasets IV: Average Energy Consumption (TJ)**

#### SFOE: Representative sample of installations (absolute Values):

 Average energy consumption of heating oil has been decreasing most since 2008. It is partly substituted by district heating.

**Evolution of the Average Energy Consumption by Source (1999-2019)** SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector




Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)

#### SFOE: Representative sample of installations (Index: 2008 = 100):

- The consumption of heating oil has been decreasing the most (-59%).
- The consumption of district heating is increasing (+6%). →Buildings program, Heating degree-days are decreasing.

**Evolution of the Average Energy Consumption by Source (1999-2019)** SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector



Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)






### **Description of the two Datasets V:** Average Green House Gas Emissions by Sector (Tons)


#### SFOE: Representative sample of installations:

 Average greenhouse gas emissions have been decreasing since 2008.

#### **EnAW:** Firms exempted from the $CO_2$ tax $\rightarrow$ target agreement:


 The reduction path of the participants with binding target agreements is more stable.





Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)

**Evolution of Average GHG Emissions by Sector (2013-2021)** Population: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector



Data Source: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector EnAW (N = 41'079)






#### **Description of the two Datasets VI:** Average GHG Emissions by Sector (Index: 2008/2013 = 100)

#### SFOE: Representative sample of installations:

 The industry sector reduces average GHG Emissions by 38% and the service sector by 29% compared to 2008.

**Evolution of Average GHG Emissions by Sector (1999-2019)** SFOE Sample: Energy Consumption in the Industry and Service Sector




Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE (N = 113'271)

#### **EnAW: Firms exempted from the** $CO_2$ tax $\rightarrow$ target agreement:

The industry sector reduces average GHG Emissions by 26% and the service sector by 22% compared to 2013.

> **Evolution of Average GHG Emissions by Sector (2013-2021)** Population: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector



Data Source: Energy Agency of the Swiss Private Sector EnAW (N = 41'079)





## Summary Statistics of Fixed Effects Regression Estimates of a previous Study presented at IEPPEC 2018 (t = 1999, ..., 2016)

Dependent variable: log(CO <sub>2</sub> )	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	
Regressor					
Dummy CO <sub>2</sub> Tax CHF 12 (2008, 2009)	-0.0490**	-0.0490** -0.0560** 0.00894		0.00860	
	(0.00871)	(0.0100)	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	
Dummy CO <sub>2</sub> Tax CHF 36 (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013)	-0.103**	-0.112**	-0.0544**	-0.0532**	
	(0.0110)	(0.0151)	(0.0188)	(0.0187)	
Dummy CO <sub>2</sub> Tax CHF 60 (2014, 2015)	-0.248**	-0.261**	-0.127**	-0.125**	
	(0.0150)	(0.0218)	(0.0295)	(0.0295)	
Dummy CO₂ Tax CHF 84 (2016)	-0.246**	-0.241**	-0.164**	-0.161**	
	(0.0181)	(0.0267)	(0.0446)	(0.0443)	
R-squared (within)	0.017	0.046	0.058	0.055	
Firm Specific Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	
Economy Wide Controls	NO	NO	YES	YES	
Trimmed upper 1%	NO	NO	NO	YES	

Note: Asterisks indicate the significance level at 5% (\*) and 1% (\*\*). The standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation across clusters. Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy.

- The baseline period are the years 1999-2007 (Pre-policy period: No CO<sub>2</sub> tax was levied until 2008).
- By controlling for other effects, the CO<sub>2</sub> levy has a significant negative impact on the greenhouse gas emissions.
- The effect is stronger, the higher the CO<sub>2</sub> tax. In 2016 the impact is -16% compared to the baseline.
- d Installations operating under a target agreement are not identified. Other policies might have an impact as well, e.g. the buildings program.



### Summary Statistics of Fixed Effects Regression Estimates for the Comparison of the Industry & the Service Sector


Dependent variable:	log(CO₂)	log(CO <sub>2</sub> )
Regressor	Model 2A	Model 2B
Dummy CO₂ Tax CHF 12 (2008, 2009)	-0.00720	0.0339
	(0.0150)	(0.0197)
Dummy CO₂ Tax CHF 36 (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013)	-0.0517*	-0.0401
	(0.0243)	(0.0292)
Dummy CO₂ Tax CHF 60 (2014, 2015)	-0.102*	-0.130**
	(0.0398)	(0.0441)
Dummy CO₂ Tax CHF 84 (2016)	-0.125*	-0.172*
	(0.0586)	(0.0680)
R-squared (within)	0.052	0.063
Sector	Industry	Services
Trimmed upper 1%	YES	YES

Note: Asterisks indicate the significance level at 5% (\*) and 1% (\*\*). The standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation across clusters. Data Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy.

- The effect of the  $CO_2$  tax in 2016 (CHF 84 per ton of  $CO_2$ eq) is in the industry sector a reduction of 12.5% (= 100 × (-0.125)) compared to the pre-policy period (before 2008).
- The effect of the CO<sub>2</sub> tax in 2016 (CHF 84 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>eq) is in the service sector a reduction of 17.2% (= 100 × (-0.172)) compared to the pre-policy period.



## Coefficient Plot for the Comparison of the Industry & the Service Sector based on the previous Regression




- Between 2008 2013 (tax rate ≤ CHF 36/ton), the impact of the tax was slightly higher in the industry sector than in the service sector.
  - → This might be due to more reduction potential in the industry sector.
- Between 2014 2016 (tax rate ≥ CHF 60/ton), the impact of the tax was slightly higher in the service sector than in the industry sector.
  - $\rightarrow$  The impact of the CO<sub>2</sub> levy in the service sector could also be confounded through the contributions of the buildings program.
- However, the differences between the two sectors are not significant (Cls' not overlapping).



### Price Chart of Heating Oil extra light (Data source: Federal Statistical Office)

Price Chart of Heating Oil 'extra light' and CO2 Levy, Category: 14'001 - 20'000 I (January 2006 - August 2022)



- Gross price of heating oil extra light: black line.
- Net price (= gross price CO<sub>2</sub> tax) of heating oil extra light: blue line.
- From 2016 onwards, the net price dropped out of the natural price fluctuations of heating oil.
- Consistent with the results of the econometric analysis: The impact of the low CO<sub>2</sub> taxes, in the first years after its introduction, was quite limited.



#### **Conclusion and Outlook I**

# What is the effect of the Swiss climate policy mix on firms energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the industry and service sector?

- Substantial reductions in the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for the average firm in the industry and service are possible, especially so when the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are heavily taxed (levy ≥ CHF 60 / ton CO<sub>2</sub>eq).
- The estimation results must be primarily driven by the CO<sub>2</sub> tax. In order to avoid paying the CO<sub>2</sub> tax (the stick) companies must agree to an emissions target in exchange (the carrot).
- However, to test the null-hypothesis, which states that the impact on greenhouse gas emissions mitigations does not differ between the two groups, firms operating under a target agreement must be identified. This is ongoing work as this presentation has shown.



#### **Conclusion and Outlook II**

#### What are the challenges facing such a research question?


- Data collecting from a federal as well as from private institution is extensively time consuming.
- SFOE data is collected by survey on installation level, whereas data from the Energy Agency is on company level:
  - $\rightarrow$  Target agreements versus CO<sub>2</sub> taxes can be disaggregated down to the company level.
  - → The distribution of the reductions among the individual installations belonging to the same company cannot be identified.
  - → However, without linking these two datasets, such information is missing (see previous study).
- Another confounder is the national buildings program.
- Self selection into the target agreement must be must be considered.



#### **Conclusion and Outlook III**

There is an ongoing political discussion of eliminating entry restrictions for the participation in the target agreements program and being exempted from the CO<sub>2</sub> tax instead.

Research to quantify these two instruments is necessary!







#### **End of the Presentation**

# Thank you very much for your attention.

**Thomas Leu** 



